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Using Postmodem Feminist Legal Theory to
Interrupt the Reinscription of Sex Stereotypes
Through the Institution of Marriage
JessicaKnouse*
say "keep within the boundaries if you want to play."
say "contradiction only makes it harder."
how can I be what I want to be?
when all I want to do is strip away these stilled constraints
and crush this charade, shred this sad masquerade
- Michael Stipe'
I. INTRODUCTION
The institution of marriage has long been an engine of the
subordination of women, the normalization of relationships, and the
repression of individual desires. The time has now come to dismantle the
institution and end its deleterious impact upon society.
The first section of this Article sets forth definitions of "sex" and "sex
stereotypes" and discusses postmodern feminist theories regarding the
insidious influence of sex stereotypes on individual identity creation. The
second section reviews the historical development of marriage as a legal
institution - focusing on its contribution to the formal codification of sex
stereotypes - and argues that marriage and sex stereotypes have become
so intertwined that disaggregation is impossible within the context of the
existing institution. The third section proposes two potential means of
Jessica Knouse received her B.A. from the College of Arts and Sciences at Boston
University in 1999 and her J.D. from Albany Law School in 2004. She served as Executive
Editor for Production of the Albany Law Review during the 2003-2004 academic year and
was valedictorian of Albany Law School's class of 2004. She is currently employed as an
Appellate Court Attorney with the New York State Supreme Court, Appellate Division,
Third Department. Beginning next August, she will serve as a law clerk for the Honorable
Howard H. Dana, Jr. of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court. Her research interests include
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interrupting the perpetual re-inscription of sex stereotypes through
marriage: the expansion of marriage and the abolition of marriage. I
ultimately conclude that the abolition of marriage is the only viable means
of effectively eradicating sex stereotypes from society. I submit that the
legal institution of marriage should be replaced by a new, more inclusive
regime, entirely free of the subordinating, normalizing, and repressive sex
stereotypes with which marriage has become irrevocably associated.
II. POSTMODERNISM AND SEX STEREOTYPES
A.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE CREATION OF SEX ROLES

1. Defining "Sex

' 2

Although the term "sex" is often ambiguous, for the purposes of this
Article, I define it to include desires, behavior, personality, sexual
orientation, 3 and anatomy. Historically, we have assigned sex based solely
on anatomy, allowing one component to determine the whole. We have
presumed, for example, that female anatomy inherently correlates with
female sexual orientation, female personality, female behavior, and female
desires. The presumption of such a correlation is called "sex stereotyping."
Without presently taking a position 6n which components of sex are
socially constructed and which are biologically determined, I challenge the
assumption that there is any inherent correlation between these
components. I argue that the determination of anatomical sex allows no
inference with respect to any other component, and therefore should not be
used to label the whole. 4
Although I challenge the inherent correlation between anatomy and
other components of sex, I recognize the high rate of actual correlation
2. I have decided not to use the term "gender" in this paper. The traditional
definitions of the terms "sex" and "gender" are as follows: "As most feminist theorists use
the terminology, 'sex' refers to the anatomical and physiological distinctions between men
and women; 'gender', by contrast, is used to refer to the cultural overlay on those
anatomical and physiological distinctions." Mary Ann C. Case, Disaggregating Gender
from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist
Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 10 (1995). I view anatomy/physiology and culture as very
closely related. I therefore do not want to presume that any feature is absolutely
anatomical/physiological or absolutely cultural. To avoid an artificial separation of the
physical from the cultural, I use only the term "sex."
3. See Email from Steve Clark, Associate Professor of Law, Albany Law School, to
Jessica Knouse (Oct. 17, 2003, 24:44:xx PST) (on file with author) (discussing same-sex
sexual orientation as analogous to other types of gender non-conformity).
4. Consider, for example, a person with female anatomy, who is attracted to women,
enjoys competitive sports, wears her hair short, and has no interest in getting married and
having children. Under current semantic norms, she would be classified as a woman (and
probably labeled a non-conformist). I question whether the term "woman" sufficiently or
accurately describes her sex, or whether it instead attempts to impose socially constructed
norms upon her.
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between the two. Statistically, most people with female anatomy exhibit
female sexual orientation, female personality, female behavior, and female
desires. Female desires include getting married, having children, and
raising a family.5 Female behaviors include domestic tasks such as cooking
and cleaning, working outside the home as a nurse, secretary, or teacher,6
and wearing skirts, "jewelry, makeup, and long or elaborate hair styles."
Female personality includes being "'understanding', warm, 'able to devote
sexual
oneself completely to others', 'gentle', . . . [and] 'kind.", 7 Female
8
males.
with
sex
having
and
to
attracted
being
orientation includes
The high rate of correlation between anatomy and other components of
sex could indicate that the correlation is biologically determined. It could,
however, just as plausibly indicate that the correlation is culturally
Whether we conclude that the correlation between
constructed.
components is biological or cultural depends partially upon the extent to
which the individual components themselves are biological or cultural. If
the components are biologically determined, then the high rate of
correlation must be biologically determined; 9 but if the components are
culturally constructed, then the high rate of correlation must be culturally
imposed.

5. With respect to the desire to get married (which will be discussed later in this

Article), Jessie Bernard's work is useful. See JESSIE BERNARD, THE FUTURE OF MARRIAGE
(1982).
6. Case, supra note 2, at 20-21 (describing the gender-conforming woman and man).
7. Case, supra note 2, at 13 (quoting from the "femininity scale" of Spence,
Helmreich, and Stapp's 1974 Personal Attributes Questionnaire (PAQ)). With respect to
personality, the Bem Sex-Role Inventory is useful. See Case, supra note 2, at n.20; Sandra
Lipsitz Bem, The Measurement of PsychologicalAndrogyny, 42 J. Consulting and Clinical
Psychol. 155, 156-57 (1974). A number of less positive female personality traits will be
listed later in the discussion of judicial descriptions of sex stereotypes.
8. See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Why DiscriminationAgainst Lesbians and Gay
Men is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 197, 216-19 (1994) (arguing that the
conviction that "certain behavior - for example, sex with women - is appropriate for
members of one sex, but not for members of the other sex" is based on traditional, sexcorrelated gender roles and is therefore sex-based discrimination); see also Adrienne Rich,
Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence, (1986), reprinted in D. KELLY
WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS

249, 249-50 (2d ed. 2002) [hereinafter MODERN FAMILY LAW] (refuting the cultural
assumption that "most women are innately heterosexual").
9. Although there is a high rate of correlation, there are many people for whom
anatomical sex does not correlate with any other components of sex. This miscorrelation
could be explained by two possibilities: (1) the miscorrelation is biologically determined
within a small percentage of the population; or (2) the miscorrelation is the result of a small
percentage of the population "misbehaving." I conclude that (if the correlation is biological)
the prior explanation is correct because it is unreasonable to assume that people would
choose to "misbehave" and thus, incur discrimination against them. It is more reasonable to
assume that they would be compelled by their biological makeup to "misbehave."
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I propose that culture has a profound - although not absolute - effect
on the components of sex. The following model of sex illustrates my
perception of the influence of biology and culture upon its components: 10

This model demonstrates that biology has the greatest effect on anatomy
and sexual orientation and the least effect on desires. Inversely, culture has
the greatest effect on desires and the least effect on sexual orientation and
anatomy. Therefore, although biology may have a weak influence on
personality, behavior, and desires, this influence is easily overcome by the
strong influence of culture. Individual variation (among people of the same
anatomical sex) is thereby suppressed with respect to personality, behavior,
and desires. Individual variation is replaced by culturally imposed sex
stereotypes. I conclude that sex stereotypes force some people to
assimilate into sex roles that may conflict with their inherent personality,
behavior, and desires."1

10. This model was inspired by the model Kenji Yoshino proposed for use in the
context of sexual orientation. Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 865-75 (2002).
11. The extent to which this assimilation is conscious may vary. Existentialist
philosophy indicates that people may assume roles in order to avoid uncertainty about how
to behave.
See, e.g., ROSEMARiE TONG, FEMINIST THOUGHT: A COMPREHENsIvE
INTRODUCTION 195-216 (1989).
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2. Women as a Homogenous Group: Difference and Dominance
Having set forth a preliminary definition of sex and a brief description
of the traditional sex stereotypes, this Article examines existing theories on
the origin of those stereotypes and helps to explain differences of opinion
within the feminist movement on how the stereotypes should be
challenged. In the 1970s, most feminist legal scholars treated women as a
homogenous group and recognized that collectively, women were
differently situated from men. Women's roles were not only different they were also inferior. Feminists debated about which should be
challenged: the sex difference or the corresponding power imbalance.'9
The classical theory, referred to by Catharine MacKinnon as "the
difference approach," is that men and women are essentially different and
that men have historically exploited these differences to create a system of
male dominance.' 3 The difference approach accepts traditional sex
stereotypes (tending toward a theory of biological determinism), but
challenges male dominance (which is universally - within the feminist
movement - presumed to be a socially constructed phenomenon). Under
the classical theory, conformity with traditional sex roles is appropriate
because anatomical sex is biologically determinative of all other
components of sex. This approach posits that the remedy for male
dominance lies in the equalization of power between the sexes, rather than
in the redefinition of sex roles.
MacKinnon responds to the difference approach with "the dominance
approach," proposing that male dominance was the primary social
achievement, and that sex differences were socially constructed in order to
perpetuate the systemic subordination of women.' 4 The dominance
approach simultaneously challenges male dominance and traditional sex
stereotypes as socially constructed impositions upon women. Under the
dominance theory, sex stereotypes are an instrument of male domination conformity is viewed as a failure to resist. Consequently, the stereotypes
must be radically redefined in order to achieve equality between the sexes.

13. Catharine MacKinnon, Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination, in
reprintedin FEMINIST LEGAL
THEORY: FOUNDATIONS 276, 277 (D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1993) ("[O]n the first day,
difference was; on the second day, a division was created upon it; on the third day, irrational
instances of dominance arose."). For an example of a feminist rendering of the difference
approach, see Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1988),
reprintedin FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: FOUNDATIONS 75, 78 (D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1993)
(arguing that men and women are fundamentally different - men view themselves as
separate from the rest of humanity, whereas women see themselves as connected with all of
humanity).
14. MacKinnon, supra note 13, at 281-282 ("[O]n the first day that matters,
dominance was achieved, probably by force. By the second day, division along the same
lines had to be relatively firmly in place. On the third day, if not sooner, differences were
demarcated, together with social systems to exaggerate them in perception and in fact...").
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW (1987),
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3. Women as a Heterogeneous Group: Diversity
Although the treatment of women as a universally subordinated group
served to effectively unite women during the early years of the second
wave of the feminist movement, several fundamental problems with the
adoption of a unified theory of women had become evident by the late
1980s. Patricia Cain argued that the treatment of women as a homogenous
group either ignored or marginalized existing relevant differences among
women. 15 Cain and other diversity theorists argued for recognition of the
existing diversity among women in order to avoid the assimilation of all
women into "a single class of white, straight, middle-class women," which
realistically represented only mainstream feminist theorists. 16 However, as
feminists began to address issues of the intersectionality of sex with race,
class, sexual orientation, and other traits, the political power of the feminist
movement began to wane, possibly as a result of the diversion of focus
from the commonality of all women to the differences among women.
B. POSTMODERNISM AND THE DECONSTRUCTION OF TRADITIONAL SEX
ROLES

1. An Introduction to Postmodem Theory
In the early 1990s, postmodern theory began to emerge as a potential
solution to some of the problems presented by earlier feminist theories.
Postmodemism analyzes the influence of socially constructed categories
(e.g., "men" and "women") on the creation of individual identity: "the self
is not, and cannot be, an autonomous, self-generating entity; it is purely a
social, cultural, historical, and linguistic creation. 1 7 Postmodern thinkers,
therefore, view individual identity as a product of the existing socially
constructed categories. The range of potential identities is limited by the
scope of the available categories. Individuals cannot transcend their own
perspective; they cannot think or feel without reference to externally
constructed categories. Free will does not exist.1 8 Individuals have no

15. Patricia Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 199 (1989), reprintedin FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: FOUNDATIONS 359, 363
(D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1993).
16. Cain, supra note 15, at 364. Cain focused mainly on the intersectionality of sex
and sexual orientation, focusing on the lesbian experience. For a foundational treatment of
the intersectionality of sex and race, see also Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the
Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine,
Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, reprinted in FEMINIST

LEGAL

THEORY:

FOUNDATIONs 383 (D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1993).
17. Peter C. Schanck, UnderstandingPostmodern Thought and Its Implicationsfor
Statutory Interpretation, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 2505, 2508 (1992) (giving an introductory
overview of postmodern philosophy).
18. Id. at 2515-17. Note that this is an articulation of postmodern theory, which is
purely constructionist. In reality, pure constructionism is a fallacy - if identity were
entirely constructed by social norms, resistance to those norms would be impossible and
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choice but to assimilate into the socially constructed categories available to
them - the narrower the scope of categories, the more homogenous the
resulting society.
Because individual identity is considered to be entirely contingent upon
socially constructed categories, understanding how these categories are
created and manipulated is crucial. Categories are created because of the
inescapable need to simplify our surroundings. Without the creation of
categories, we would perceive each object as unique, and our cognitive
abilities would be overwhelmed by the immense complexity. 19 Jacques
Derrida proposed that the primary means of categorization within Western
thought is the creation of binary oppositions - for example: man/woman;
straight/gay; white/black; rich/poor.20 Within an opposition, Derrida noted
that one component is often privileged while the other is marginalized one component dominates the other.2 '
Derrida introduced "deconstruction" as one method of equalizing the
power balance between the two components of a binary opposition. 22
Deconstruction involves the reconfiguration of a binary opposition such
that the dominance hierarchy is inverted: the privileged concept is
marginalized and the marginalized concept is privileged.2 3 The underlying
goal is destabilization of the power relationship between the two
components rather than inversion of the hierarchy.24 Once the power
relationship is destabilized, neither component is privileged, and the
categories themselves ultimately become meaningless (within the context
of the deconstruction).
As social categories are deconstructed, assimilative demands upon
individuals are diminished. The absence of strongly assimilative categories
creates ambiguity, which enables individuals to self-determine their own
identities to a far greater extent. The end product is a more diverse society,
with a broad array of potential identity models from which individuals may
choose. Although the idea of individual choice is in conflict with a strict
postmodern ideology (given the earlier statement that free will does not
exist), 25 wholesale rejection of essential individual preference obviates the
need for social change.
I, therefore, adopt a modified version of
postmodern thought, wherein essential diversity exists on some level but is
society would never change. The very impulse to deconstruct social categories and resist
social norms provides proof that our identities are not entirely socially constructed.
19. Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories,47 STAN. L. REv. 1161
(1995), reprintedin MODERN FAMILY LAW, supra note 8, at 1250.
20. Schanck, supra note 17, at 2525.
21. Id. at 2525-27.
22. Id. at 2527.
23. Id. at 2527-28.
24. Id. at 2528 (explaining that once the originally privileged component is
deconstructed, both the original hierarchy and the inverted hierarchy are unstable - either
one can be deconstructed ad infinitum).
25. See Schanck supra note 18; see also supra text accompanying note 18.
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nearly always destroyed by societal demands to assimilate into constructed
categories. 26 Under this modified theory, resistance to social categorization
is possible and desirable because it leads to a more diverse society and
greater individual choice.
2. Postmodern Feminism
Postmodern feminists are concerned specifically with deconstruction of
the male/female binary, because it privileges male sex roles, marginalizes
female sex roles, and has the additional deleterious effect of limiting
individuals to one of two potential roles, a choice predetermined by
anatomical sex. The postmodem feminist goal is not simply to equalize
power between the sexes 27 or to redefine the existing sex roles.28 Rather,
the goal is to destabilize the sex hierarchy such that the traditional
categories - "man" and "woman" - are eventually rendered irrelevant to
identity creation. 29
While postmodern feminists seek to deconstruct sex categories, they
are aware of the problem encountered by the diversity theorists of
simultaneously diffusing not only the category of "women" but also the
political power behind the category. Thus, while postmodern feminism
destabilizes and thereby destroys sex categories, it also draws on the
political power created by the inverted sex hierarchy in which women are
privileged and men are marginalized. The destruction of sex categories
allows for recognition of the essential diversity among women, while the
inversion of the sex hierarchy allows for recognition of the socially
constructed sameness among women.
Postmodemism accomplishes this simultaneous destruction of and
empowerment through sex categories by focusing on sex as a discursive
construct. Maxine Eichner draws on the work of Jacques Derrida and
Michel Foucault to explain postmodern "discourse theory":
[D]iscourse does not simply mirror a world that preexists it, but
rather constructs the world by constructing meaning. The meanings
produced by discursive systems shape the way we see the world,
what is possible within it, and even the foundation of our own
identities.
Postmodernists view sex stereotypes as a product of social discourse.
26. Cf the gender model Yoshino supra note 10 and diagram.
27. Cf. the difference approach MacKinnon supra note 13 and accompanying text.
28. Cf. the dominance approach MacKinnon supra note 13; see also supra text
accompanying note 14.
29. See, e.g., Maxine Eichner, On Postmodern Feminist Legal Theory, 36 HARv.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 38 (2001). Because gender is such an integral part of individual
identity, the absence of a broad array of viable models is absolutely stifling.
30. Eichner, supra note 29, at 7.
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Although women may have biologically determined individual differences,
women as a class are limited with respect to the creation of sex identity by
the discursive constructs available to them. 31 Social discourse normalizes
differences and causing
sex identity, effectively eliminating individual
32
widespread assimilation to sex stereotypes.
Social discourse is a broad concept, which includes many modes of
social expression - for example, educational systems, religious traditions,
community norms, law, and all forms of media - television, film,
advertisements, magazines, etc. Social discourse not only reflects the
prevailing sex constructs, but also reproduces them within the individual
members of society.33 This paper focuses on the potential of law, and
specifically the legal institution of marriage, to interrupt the perpetual
reproduction of socially constructed sex categories. The extent to which
law influences culture is unclear; law has historically employed sex
distinctions which have had the effect of constructing sex categories, but
those sex categories have remained culturally relevant long after the sex
distinctions were deliberately eliminated from the law.34
III. MARRIAGE AND THE PERPETUATION OF SEX
STEREOTYPES
A. THE HISTORICAL ESTABLISHMENT OF SEX ROLES WITHIN THE
INSTITUTION OF MARRIAGE

From its inception, the institution of marriage has been instrumental in
assimilating men and women into socially constructed sex roles. Little
attention has previously been given to the way in which the legal institution
of marriage functions as an aspect of social discourse, perpetuating the
reproduction of traditional sex stereotypes.
1. Personality, Behavior, and Desires
a.

Establishing Sex Stereotypes within the Law

Blackstone's Commentaries35 were foundational in establishing the
integral relationship between conformity to sex stereotypes and the
institution of marriage. Women were expected to marry and otherwise
conform to socially constructed sex stereotypes. Marriage laws codified
these stereotypes. Under the law, married women were subordinate to and
31.
32.
33.
34.
the extent
gender.")

Id. at 40-41.
Id. at 38, 40-41.
Id. at 25-26 (drawing on the work of Sandra Bartky).
Eichner, supra note 29, at 25-26 (suggesting that "[t]heorists [should evaluate)
to which the law can interrupt the cycle of cultural practices that construct

35. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES (1765-1769),

FAMILY

LAW,

supra note 8, at 442-45.

reprinted in MODERN
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dependent upon their husbands. Blackstone described the legal condition
of a married woman:
By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is,
the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during
the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that
of the husband; under whose wing, protection, and cover, she
performs everything; ... and her condition during marriage is
called her coverture.36
It was presumed that married women would act according to the will of
their husbands. 37 To enforce this presumption, married women were
prohibited from independently contracting or deeding property, and any
contracts or deeds they independently entered into or executed were
considered void.3 8 In order to further discourage these independent acts,
husbands were allowed to engage in "moderate correction" of their wives,
which could involve verbal as well as physical abuse. 39 The husband's
control over his wife's body was so complete that he was allowed to rape
her at his will. As Lord Hale said in the 17th century: "[T]he husband
cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for
by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given up
herself in this kind unto her husband, which she cannot retract." 40
The perceived importance of perpetuating traditional sex roles within
the institution of marriage is reflected in Bradwell v. Illinios 4 1 and In re
Goodell,42 both decided in the 1870s. The issue in both cases was whether
a state could constitutionally refuse to admit women to the practice of law.
In both cases, the court held that it could. Justice Bradley (concurring with
the majority in Bradwell) and Chief Justice Ryan (writing for the
36. Id.
37. Id. (noting that husbands were presumed to control their wives and were
therefore held legally accountable for their wives' actions).
38. Id. In marriage, the husband was given unilateral control over the wife's real and
personal property (with the exception that he could not alienate her necessary clothes). This
control was weakened by married women's property acts in the mid to late 19th century.
MODERN FAMILY LAW, supra note 8, at 256-58. Although husbands were granted the power
to control their wives, they were also legally required to support them. See, e.g., McGuire v.
McGuire, 59 N.W.2d 336 (Neb. 1953); Earle v. Earle, 43. N.W. 118 (Neb. 1889).
39. BLACKSTONE, supra note 35, at 442-45. See, e.g., State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. 453
(1868) (upholding the acquittal of a husband who hit his wife with a switch, on the ground
that courts should not interfere with family government but rather should defer to the
husband, who is head of the family).
40. 1 SIR MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 629 (London,
1736). Many states continued to recognize the marital rape exemption until very recently.
For example, New York's marital rape exemption was not struck down until 1984. See
People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567 (N.Y. 1984).
41. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
42. 39 Wis. 232 (1875).
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Wisconsin Supreme Court in Goodell) both felt that denying married
women access to the legal profession was justified because such a denial
served to perpetuate traditional sex roles.
Justice Bradley subscribed to the philosophy of biological determinism,
and characterized the natural sex roles as follows:
[T]he civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a
wide difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man and
woman. Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender.
The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the
female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil
life. The constitution of the family organization, which is founded
in the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates
the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain
and functions of womanhood.43
Note that women could not necessarily engage in all of the domestic
behaviors described by Justice Bradley unless they were married.
Unmarried women could potentially argue that sex conformity
requirements did not apply to them. Justice Bradley recognized this issue
and responded with the following:
It is true that many women are unmarried and not affected by any
of the duties, complications, and incapacities arising out of the
married state, but these are exceptions to the general rule. The
paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble
and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the
Creator. And the rules of civil society must be adapted to the
general constitution of things, and cannot be based upon
exceptional cases. 44
Unmarried women were thus dismissed as deviant, and to the extent that
they failed to conform - by getting married and behaving according to
traditional sex roles - they were not entitled to protection under the law.
In Goodell, Chief Justice Ryan likewise adopted the position that
anatomical sex was biologically determinative of all components of sex:
The law of nature destines and qualifies the female sex for the
bearing and nurture of the children of our race and for the custody
of the homes of the world and their maintenance in love and honor.
And all life-long callings of women, inconsistent with these radical
43. Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring).
44. Id. at 141-42 (Bradley, J., concurring).
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and sacred duties of their sex ...are departures from the order of
nature; and when voluntary, treason against it.... The peculiar
qualities of womanhood, its gentle graces, its quick sensibility...
its emotional impulses, its subordination of hard reason to
sympathetic feeling, [disqualify women from professions outside
the home] .
Again, failure to conform to sex stereotypes is punished: "[I]t is public
policy to provide for the sex, not for its superfluous members ... .',46 Both
Bradwell and Goodell illustrate not only the instrumentality of the
institution of marriage in enforcing sex stereotypes, but also the extent to
which marriage is a part of the stereotype. All women are expected to
marry, and within marriage they are expected to conform to sex
stereotypes. Therefore, any social policy directed at women will, through
its assumption of marriage, enforce conformity with sex stereotypes.
b.

Prohibiting Sex Stereotypes within the Law

In the 1970s, courts expanded their interpretation of the Equal
Protection Clause 47 to include the prohibition of sex discrimination. The
codification of sex stereotypes within the law was prohibited with respect
to anatomy, personality, behavior, and desires. Statutes perpetuating
traditional sex stereotypes were invalidated.
In Reed v. Reed,48 decided in 1971, the Supreme Court invalidated a
statute that preferred males over females as administrators of estates. The
statutory distinction was based on the stereotypical sex expectation that
males would have more business expertise than women and, therefore,
would be more capable as administrators. The Court held that the statute
violated the Equal Protection Clause.
In Frontiero v. Richardson, decided in 1973, the Court struck down a
statute that allowed servicemen to claim their wives as dependents whether
they were dependent or not, but allowed servicewomen to claim their
husbands as dependents only after showing that they were actually
dependent.49 Justice Brennan, writing for a plurality, 50 found that the
statute was based on the stereotypical sex expectation that women would be
dependent whereas men would not. The statute was invalidated as a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.5 '
45. Goodell, 39 Wis. at 245.
46. Id.
47. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
48. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
49. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
50. Justices Douglass, White, and Marshall joined Justice Brennan's opinion.
51. See also Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) and Califano v.
Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (both striking down statutes that presumed women were
dependent on men).
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2. Sexual Orientation
The Court's prohibition of sex discrimination in cases like Reed and
Frontiero, however, did not extend to the prohibition of sexual orientation
discrimination. Judges have traditionally viewed "sex" and "sexual
orientation" as two entirely separate entities. Thus, while they implicitly
defined "sex" to include anatomy, personality, behavior, and desires, they
failed to recognize sexual orientation as a component of sex. As a result,
the courts refused to employ the standards established within the context of
sex discrimination in evaluating claims of discrimination based on sexual
orientation.
Marriage has not only been instrumental in perpetuating sex
stereotypes with respect to anatomy, personality, behavior, and desires, but
also with respect to sexual orientation. Marriage codifies the culturally
imposed sex stereotype that women will be attracted to and have sex with
men, and that men will be attracted to and have sex with women.5 2 By
adopting a very narrow view of sex, which excludes sexual orientation,
judges have nearly always refused to accept this line of reasoning. Judges,
therefore, are willing to recognize and eliminate sex conformity
requirements with respect to anatomy, personality, behavior, and desires,
but not with respect to sexual orientation. Nevertheless, this argument is
occasionally discussed and sometimes accepted.5 3
In Baker v. State,54 the Vermont State Supreme Court held that the
denial of marriage benefits to same-sex couples was a violation of the
state's Common Benefits Clause, because there was no rational basis for
restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples. Although the majority
rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the marriage statute created a sexbased classification, 55 Justice Johnson adopted the sex discrimination
argument in her concurring opinion.
She used the following example to illustrate how similarly situated men
and women are subject to disparate treatment under the Vermont marriage
statute:
Dr. A and Dr. B both want to marry Ms. C, an X-ray technician.
Dr. A may do so because Dr. A is a man. Dr. B may not because
Dr. B is a woman. Dr. A and Dr. B are people of opposite sexes
52. See, e.g., Koppelman, supra note 8; See also Rich, supra note 8.
53. See, e.g., Baker v. State, 170 Vt. 194 (1999) (Johnson, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 440 Mass. 309 (2003)
(Greaney, J., concurring).
54. Baker, 170 Vt. 194 (1999).
55. id. at 215 n.13 (explaining that there is no disparate treatment because "each sex
is equally prohibited from precisely the same conduct"). Furthermore, the majority explains
that the equal application argument used in Loving is not analogous because the statute in
Loving was used to maintain white supremacy, whereas this statute is not being used to
maintain male supremacy. Id. (Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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who are similarly situated in the sense that they both want to marry
a person of their choice. The statute disqualifies Dr. B from
marriage solely on the basis of her sex and treats her differently
from Dr. A, a man. This is sex discrimination.56
This example refutes the majority's contention that women and men are
"prohibited from precisely the same conduct." Under the statute, women
are prohibited from marrying women, whereas men are prohibited from
marrying men. These prohibitions flow from stereotypes about the roles of
men and women: a man's role is to marry a woman; a woman's role is to
marry a man. Thus, the statute perpetuates sex stereotypes.
Justice Johnson acknowledged that marriage laws have historically
employed sex-based distinctions to subordinate women, and she questioned
whether this particular distinction was merely "a vestige of the common
law unequal marriage relationship" or whether there was a currently valid
governmental purpose. After analyzing the State's articulated purposes and
finding none of them to be valid, she concluded that the present distinction
must be a vestige of the past subordination of women within the institution
of marriage.57 Justice Johnson did not contend that the actual purpose of
the statute was to maintain male supremacy. Rather, she recognized that
sex stereotyping has historically been used to maintain male supremacy,
and that there 58should be no state-sanctioned sex-role stereotyping absent a
valid purpose.
3. The Persistence of Sex Stereotypes within Culture
Although sex stereotypes have been almost entirely eradicated from the
legal definition of marriage - at least with respect to anatomy, personality,
behavior, and desires - they remain strong within the cultural definition of
marriage. Therefore, although conformity is no longer legally mandated, it
may still be culturally required. I propose that the persistence of sex
stereotypes in society is largely facilitated by the continued existence of the
legal institution of marriage. As postmodern theory dictates, a word
"cannot... be reconceptualized outside the bounds of its historical
determinants., 59 Thus, "marriage" - the predominant institution through
which conformity with sex stereotypes has been legally mandated -

concurring in part and dissenting in part).
56. Baker, 170 Vt., at 253-54 (Johnson, J.,
57. This portion of Justice Johnson's decision responds to and refutes the majority's
claim that the statute is not used to maintain male supremacy and is therefore not analogous
to the statute in Loving. Baker, 170 Vt., at 262 (Johnson, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
58. Id. at 254 n.l 1.
59. Eichner, supra note 29, at 19 (making this argument with respect to the sex
binary, and noting that the word "'woman' cannot... be reconceptualized outside the
bounds of its historical determinants").
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cannot be culturally disassociated
redefinition is impossible.6 °

from historical sex

stereotypes

IV. SOLUTIONS: INTERRUPTING THE REINSCRIPTION OF
SEX STEREOTYPES THROUGH MARRIAGE
A. THE POPULAR SOLUTION: EXPANSION

1. Narrow Expansion: Allowing Same-Sex Marriage
The currently popular solution is to expand the definition of marriage
to allow greater diversity within the institution. Narrow expansion would
allow same-sex couples to get married. It is often argued that allowing
same-sex marriage would break down sex stereotypes within the
institution. 61 This argument, however, ignores the assimilative and
normalizing effects of marriage. These effects are evident, in Goodridge v.
Department of Public Health,62 in which all of the plaintiffs' relationships
essentially mimicked stereotypical opposite sex marriages. The couples
did not effectively challenge the social norms associated with marriage.
Other couples, whose relationships do not replicate a marriage - perhaps,
for example, because they are not monogamous - remain marginalized.
Thus, the expansion of marriage to include same sex couples will have a
homogenizing rather than diversifying effect.
This was predicted by Paula Ettelbrick:
[M]arriage will not liberate us as lesbians and gay men. In fact, it
will constrain us, make us more invisible, force our assimilation
into the mainstream, and undermine the goals of gay liberation.
... [A]ttaining the right to marry will not transform our society

from one that makes narrow, but dramatic distinctions between
those who are married and those who are not married to one that
respects and encourages choice of relationships and family
diversity.63
60. The court's decision in Baker provides some evidence that redefinition is
impossible. Rather than ordering the immediate issuance of marriage licenses, the majority
allowed the legislature to create a functionally equivalent institution with a different name"civil unions." Baker, 170 Vt. at 226. Clearly, there is something special about the word
"marriage."
61. See, e.g., Douglas NeJaime, Marriage,Cruising,and Life in Between: Clarifing
Organizational Positionalities in Pursuit of Polyvocal Gay-Based Advocacy, 38 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 511, 523 (2003) (articulating the common argument that "[t]he most
straightforward response to the critique that same-sex marriage is normalizing argues that
same-sex marriage actually de-normalizes heterosexuality," and citing William Eskridge as
a proponent of this argument); see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., EQUALITY PRACTICE: CIMIL
UNIONS AND THE FUTURE OF GAY RIGHTS 209 (2002).
62. 440 Mass. 309 (2003).
63. Paula Ettelbrick, Since When is Marriagea Path to Liberation?,in OUT/LOOK
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2. Broad Expansion
Perhaps a broader expansion of the definition of marriage, including
even more types of currently marginalized relationships, would solve the
problem. While I argue that broad expansion of the types of relationships
which are afforded state benefits is entirely necessary, lumping them all
into the linguistic category of marriage is problematic: (1) because of the
previously discussed normalizing effects of marriage on all relationships;
and (2) because it would likely be perceived as improper to label these
alternative relationships "marriages." I therefore propose that, rather than
expanding the definition of marriage, we should institute a new regime.
B. MY SOLUTION: ABOLITION

It is impossible to linguistically disaggregate marriage and sex
stereotypes. For as long as marriage exists, sex stereotypes will be
perpetually reinscribed. In order to eradicate the stereotypes, the legal
institution of marriage must be abolished. The postmodern concept of
deconstruction is particularly useful in this instance: 64 marriage can be
deconstructed.
The binary opposition at issue here is married/unmarried - married
relatiopships are privileged; unmarried relationships are marginalized.
Inversion of this hierarchy can be accomplished by privileging unmarried
relationships through recognition of their unique value to society. Once the
institution is destabilized such that neither category is dominant, the
categories themselves will become meaningless.
In a practical sense, this can be accomplished through abolition of the
legal institution of marriage and its replacement with a new, more
inclusive, regime that is free of any historical association with sex
stereotypes. Martha Fineman criticizes the idea that legally recognized
relationships must be sexual:
"Liberals" seek to expand the traditional nuclear-family model,
urging the recognition of informal heterosexual unions within the
definition of family. There are also calls for acceptance and legal

NATIONAL GAY AND LESBIAN QUARTERLY, no. 6 (Fall 1989), reprinted in SAME-SEx
MARRIAGE: PRO AND CON: A READER 118, 119-20 (Andrew Sullivan ed., 1997). See also
Michael Bronski, Why Do Gays Want to Say "I Do? ":Fightingfor marriage is like fighting
over yesterday's leftovers, in Z MAGAZINE 55 (Oct. 2003).
64. Although scholars often argue that postmodernism is not useful in the law
because its deconstructive forces are incompatible with law's creative forces, in this
instance, where the goal is to undermine an institution, deconstruction is a very effective
tool.

Summer 20051
Summer 20051

THE INSTITUTION OF MARRIAGE

175

175
THE INSTITUTION OF MARRIAGE
legitimation of same-sex relationships in the form of proposed
domestic partner laws. But these reforms merely reinforce the idea
of the sexual family.6

Fineman argues for the de-sexualization of marriage, so that all types of
couples (and potentially also groups of more than two) could declare their
interdependency and receive state recognition. 6 6 Under a de-sexualized
regime, the relationships recognized could include an adult taking care of
an elderly parent, a sister and brother, or two friends.67 I conclude that the
abolition of marriage is the best solution to achieve sex equality and create
a more diverse society, which would allow individuals to determine their
own identities, free from the constraints of socially imposed sex
stereotypes.68

65. MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY,
AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 143 (1995).
66. See generally id. at 143-176. One of the reasons that the state initially got
involved in sanctioning marriage was because it was a relationship of dependency-the state
provided benefits to the man because he provided benefits for his dependent wife. Id. at 45. Fineman argues that other types of dependent relationships could also take advantage of
the functional benefits of marriage. Id.
67. See also Bronski, supra note 63, at 58 (suggesting "the French pacte civil de
solidarit-which essentially gives marriage rights to any two people (gay, straight, the
sexually involved, or those who are just roommates) who want to declare themselves a legal
couple" as one alternative to marriage).
68. Patricia Cain argues that the abolition of marriage is constitutionally possible.
Patricia Cain, Imagine There's No Marriage,16 QUINNIPIAC. L. REv. 27, 42 (1996).
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